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DISTINGUISHING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT [WASHINGTON]
The line of demarcation between civil
and criminal contempts is exceedingly
hazy.' Contempt proceedings are neither
wholly civil nor altogether criminal, and it
may not always be easy to classify a particular contempt action as belonging to one
or the other category. It may partake of
the characteristics of both.2 For this reason, such an action is said to be sui generis
by the courts. In general, contempts of
court for which punishment is inflicted for
the primary purpose of vindicating public
authority are denominated criminal. Those
in which the enforcement of civil rights
and remedies is the ultimate object are
called ciiil contempt proceedings. 3 Corpus
Juris Secundum defines civil contempt as
failing to do something ordered to be done
in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein.' But that source
further intimates that what might ordinarily be a civil contempt may become a
criminal contempt when
the authority of
5
the court is flouted.
State v. Sanchez," a recent Washington
case, raises this question of determining the
differences between civil and criminal contempt. In that case judgment had been
rendered against the appellant in a previous
filiation proceeding, but he had failed to
support the illegitimate child as directed
by the court in that proceeding. Action

for contempt was instituted by the deputy
prosecuting attorney for King County, and
appellant was adjudged guilty. Although
he was in arrears only twenty dollars. he
was ordered to pay fifty dollars into thL
?ourt within one week, or face incarceration until it should be paid. Appellant gave
notice of appeal, but did not post an appeal
bond, as is required in civil actions.7 Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal for
the reason that the case was civil in nature,
and required the giving of a proper appeal
bond.
Because the lower court had failed to
make and enter findings of fact upon which
to rest its judgment of contempt, the reviewing court declared that it could not
make any determination of two important
problems in the case, viz., the problem of
determining the nature of the proceedings
from their purpose, i.e., whether they were
coercive or remedial, or punitive in whole
or in part. and the problem of the sufficiency of inability to comply with an order
of the court as a defence for failure to comply. The trial court is required to enter
its findings by statute and precedent.' If
the case was one of criminal contempt, appeal bond was not necessary, and this
failure to enter findings would be sufficient
to remand it. For the purpose of remanding, the court assumed this, but it reserved

I State v. Bland. 189 Mo. 197. 88 S. W. 28, 3
Ann. Cas. 1044 (1905): Costilla Land and Investment Co. v. Allen, 15 N. M. 528. 110 Pac. 847
(1910).
2 State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey, 164 Wash. 140.
2 P. (2d) 79 (1931); In re Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458 (1903) and cases cited:
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324
(1903).
':In re Nevitt. 117 Fed. 448 (1902); Bessette v.
W. B. Conkey, 194 U. S. 324 (1903): In re Debs.
158 U. S. 564 (1894); Gompers v. Buck Stove

and Range Co.. 221 U. S. 418 (1910). 34 L. R. A.
(NS) 874: Denny v. State. 203 Ind. 682. 182 N. E.
313 (1932); Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344.
157 N. E. 684 (1927). 54 A. L. R. 1422: State ex
rel. Dailey v. Dailey. 164 Wash. 140. 2 P'2d)
79 (1931).
4 17 C. J. S. 8. §6.
'Ibid.
6;4 Wash. (2d) 432. 104 P(2d) 464 (1940).
7 Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) t1721.
' Rem. Rev. Stat t1932) §367: State ex rel.
Dunn v. Plese. 134 Wash. 443, 235 Pac. 961 (1925).
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the right to re-examine the question in the
event that the case should again appear
before it, amplified by appropriate findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The policy
behind such a decision is not hard to recognize, but the real problem of determining
the differences between the two kinds of
contempt goes unsolved.
The outstanding case on this problem in
the federal courts is that of Gompers v.
Buck Stove and Range CoY There the
United States Supreme Court said that the
affirmative violation of an injunction, without special elements of contumacy, called
for coercive action on the part of the court
and not for a punitive sentence.' 0 The Indiana court came squarely up against this
problem in Denny v. State." That case
also arose out of the violation of an injunction, and the trial court found the defendants guilty of criminal contempt and
placed a fine upon them. The Supreme
Court of that state denounced such a decision, saying 'that the injunction having
been granted solely for the protection of
the other parties to the suit, its violation is
a wrong primarily to those parties and not
to the state, and is, therefore, a civil rather
than a criminal contempt, in absence of an
intent to defy the court and thus affront
12
the dignity of the state.
A similar view was taken in an earlier
Washington case: "There is a difference
between 'quasi-criminal contempt' and civil
contempt. A judgment for criminal contempt is not only unnecessary, but positively unwarranted, unless there has been
a wilful disobedience of the court's order.
A party may be guilty of both a criminal
and a civil contempt, or may be guilty of

one and not the other. A criminal contempt,
actual or constructive, or, as Blackstone
says, 'direct or circumstantial,' partakes of
the quality of an offense against the state;
whereas, a civil contempt under the statute
is such a disobedience of an order of a court
of competent jurisdiction, entered for the
benefit or advantage of a party to a civil
action, as works a loss or injury to the litigant. The one is quasi-criminal and theother is a civil wrong; the one is absolved
by a fine payable to the state or imprisonment, and the other, by reparation to the
other party litigant. Under Ballinger's Ann.
Codes and St., Sec. 5807, Pierce's Code,
Sec. 1476, providing that, if any loss or injury to a party in an action prejudicial to
his rights therein have been caused by the
'contempt,' the court may give judgment
that the party aggrieved recover of the defendant a sum sufficient'to indemnify him,
it is not necessary that the contempt be a
criminal one for which a fine could be adjudged."' 3 This is the general view taken
in cases of contempt14 arising out of violations of injunctions.
The closest analogous case to the principal case of this note is that of State ex rel.
Geiger v. Geiger, 5 a contempt proceeding
arising out of failure to pay alimony as
ordered in a divorce suit. Wilful disobedierice of the mandate was alleged. The defendant was found guilty of contempt by
the trial court; he appealed, but failed to
post the appeal bond as required in appeals in civil cases. The appeal was dismissed because of this defect, the court saying that the mandate being for the benefit
of the other party in the divorce suit, violation of it was an injury to her rather than

9 Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221
U. S. 418 (1910).
N,The following is an illuminating excerpt
from that opinion:
"For example. If the defendant should refuse
to pay alimony, or to make a conveyance required by a decree for specific performance, he
could be committed until he complied with the
order. Unless there were special elements of
contumacy, the refusal to pay or to comply
with the order is treated as being in resistance
to the other party rather than as contempt of
court. The order fbr imprisonment in this class
of cases, therefore, is not to vindicate the authority of the law, but is remedial, and is intended to coerce the defendant to do the thing
required by the order for the benefit of the
complainant. If imprisoned, as aptly stated in In

Re Nevitt, 54 C. C. A. 622, 117 Fed. 451, 'he carries the keys of his prison in his pocket.' He
can end his sentence and discharge himself at
any moment by doing what he had previuusly
refused to do."
11203 Ind. 682. 182 N. E. 313 (1932).
12 Ibid.
13 State ex rel. Newcomen Boom Co. v. North
Shore Boom and Driving Co., 55 Wash. 1,107
Pac. 196 (1910).
14 Costilla Land and Invest. Co. v. Allen, 15
N. M. 528, 110 Pac. 847 (1910); Gorham v. New
Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 72 AtI. 1012 (1909); Re
McCormack, 117 N. Y. S.70 (1909); and the cases
cited in note 3 supra. with the exception of the
Washington case which involved the violation
of a mandate rather than an injunction.
-20 Wash. 181. 54 Pac. 1129 (1898).
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to the state. The court would not admit that
the "wilful disobedience" alleged was of
such a nature as to make the contempt
criminal rather than civil.
Further citation of authorities for the
point intended to be made would only be
redundant and tautologous. The point is
that "wilful disobedience of the court order- or "special elements of contumacy"
must be shown to change an otherwise civil
contempt to one of a criminal nature, or
to give it a double aspect. Viewed in the
light of these opinions, the facts of the principal case indicate that the contempt was
basically civil rather than criminal.
However, if this is assumed to be a case
of criminal contempt, the problem of the
function of the defendant's answer to the
contempt charge, in relation to the necessity of entering findings of fact by the trial
court, presents itself. The question arising
is: Does the answer receive a different
treatment in the two types of proceedings,
and are findings of fact required in both?
The defendant's answer to the show cause
order very clearly sets out his inability to
comply with the order of the court in the
filiation proceeding to support the child.
The defendant alleged that all his meagre
wages as a hotel clerk and as an employee
of a steamship company had been needed
to support his own family; that he had been
involuntarily unemployed since the inception of the filiation suit.
The effect given the defendant's answer
in a contempt action depends upon whether
or not a state still follows the old common
law rule. Where the common law is followed, quite a bit of difference is attached
1;17 C. J. S. 108 §83.
37 People v. Rongetti. 344 Ill. 107. 176 N. E.
292 (1931); Zuver v. State. 188 Ind. 60, 121 N. E.
828 (1919,.
,1People v. Gilbert. 281 Ill.
619. 118 N. E. 196
(1917): State v. Branner. 174 Ind. 684. 93 N. E.
70 (1910).
]!'Stewart v. State. 140 Ind. 7. 39 N. E. 508
(1895).
2E,
Ibid.; People v. White. 334 Ill. 465. 166 N. E.
100. 64 A. L. R. 1006 (1929).
21 Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932)
§367: State ex rel.
Dunn v. Plese. 134 Wash. 443. 235 Pac. 961 (1925).
22 In State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey. 164 Wash.
140. 2 P(2) 79. (1931). the court declared that
if the proceeding is for criminal contempt. the
presumption is that the defendant is innocent.
and he cannot be examined concerning the matters which were the subject-matter of the inquiry. To hold otherwise would be to allow

to the answer in the two types of contempt
proceedings.'" A denial under oath is conclusive in criminal contempt, ' - and no evidence is taken.'- If the denial is false, the
defendant may be punished for perjury.
but may not be held in contempt.'- In civil
contempt cases, however, the denial is not
conclusive and the court may hear evidence.'- Although the question of the function of the answer has not been raised directly in the State of Washington, neither
statute:- nor the cases recognize a difference in its operation in the two types of
contempt actions, and apparently, evidence
can be taken in bothY2
It is almost universally held that inability
to pay money in accordance with the order
of the court is a good defense to the charge
of contempt. 2 ; Cases arising out of the
failure to pay alimony or separate maintenance costs are the closest analogies found
in the state of Washington to the principal
case, and in those cases lack of present
2
ability to pay is a complete defense. '
Therefore, if the defendant in the principal
case can establish the defense alleged. he
should not be found guilty of either criminal or civil contempt, if the same rule applies to maintenance of an illegitimate child
as applies to alimony and separate maintenance cases; and there seems to be no
ground on which to distinguish the cases
in this regard.
As to the necessity of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, a distinction between
civil and criminal contempt actions is recognized where the common law view obtains. As to findings of fact in civil contempt where the common law distinction is
self-incrimination. If criminal and civil contempt are combined in the same action, if the
defendant is questioned, the court's power to
enter a purely punitive order cannot thereafter be invoked.
2:t In re Sobol. 242 Fed. 487. (C. C. A.): Mueller v. Van Driessche. 236 Ill. App. 420 (1925):
Laff v. Laff. 161 Minn. 122. 200 N. W. 936 (1924):
Burack v. Mayers. 122 N. J. Eq. 270. 194 Atl.
178 (1937): In re Lieberman. 264 N. Y. S. 303
(1933): State v. Phipps. 174 Wash. 443. 24 PI2d)
1073 (1933).
21 State ex rel. Smith v. Smith. 17 Wash. 430.
50 Pac. 52 (1897); State ex rel Olsen v. Allen.
14 Wash. 684. 45 Pac. 644 (1896); In re Anderson. 97 Wash. 683, 167 Pac. 70 (1917): Snook v.
Snook. 110 Wash. 310..188 Pac. 502. 9 A. L. R.
262 (1920): Hubbard v. Hubbard. 130 Wash. 593.
228 Pac. 692 (1924).

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
recognized we refer to Ruling Case Law:
"That the facts constituting the contempt
need not be set out in the record is the
general rule in England, and there are some
authorities in this country holding that a
judgment or sentence for contempt is valid
without any recital of the facts which constituted the contempt where there are moving papers which contain the facts. But
there is a decided tendency toward adopting a rule which obviously serves the surer
ends of justice, that a court has no right
to adjudge a party to be in contempt of
court without making findings of fact showing as a matter of law that the party accused is in fact guilty of contempt."
If the case is one of criminal contempt,
the same source says, "In some courts,
when defendant is attached for contempt
of court for a criminal offense and files a
sworn answer, that answer, if sufficient
to purge him of the alleged contempt, may
be taken as true and the defendant discharged. But this rule applies only where
the proceeding is brought to vindicate the
law or dignity of the court, and does not
apply to acts treated as contempts, for the
enforcement of orders and decrees, as a
part of the remedy sought to be enforced;
25
and it has been held not to be conclusive.1
However, the principal case was properly
remanded for findings of fact because
Washington has done away with the common law distinction and requires such find-

ings of fact in all contempt actions.'- , In
states such as Illinois or Indiana, which retain the older view, such an order could
not be entered by the reviewing court. The
defendant in a criminal contempt case
would be
ordered released upon his sworn
27
answer.
Assuming this case to be one of criminal
contempt, the defendant is imprisoned indefinitely until he pays the fine, not until
he complies with the order of the court
in the original filiation action. Nowhere
can authority be foxind for this form of sentence in a criminal trial. It means that the
defendant must face life-long imprisonment if he is so unfortunate as not to have
money to pay the fine imposed on him. He
surely wold not have the opportunity to
earn money to pay it while in prison. Such
a judgment recalls to mind our legislative
movement to abolish debtors' prisons, and
.makes one feel that the courts have lost
sight of the policy behind it when it passes
such a harsh and unreasonable sentence.
The penalty should be determinate in time
or certain as to the amount of money. ' 8
There cannot be an indeterminate
sentence
29
passed upon a specific fine.
The court has the alternative bf viewing
the fine as being for the benefit of the illegitimate child. This, however, would make
the suit a civil one, and the appeal would
fail for want of an appeal bond.
JosEPH C. OwNs.

COMPENSATION FOR COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL [INDIANA]
The sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-

contemporaneous with their constitutions.
The laws of many of these states have

joy the right ... to have the assistance of

gone on to provide that where an indigent
defendant in a criminal case is unable to

counsel for his defense"; practically all of
the states have similar provisions either
in their constitutions or in statutes almost

hire an attorney the court will appoint
counsel for him.' But where there is no
such provision the courts have held that

2-56 R. C. L. 526 §49.
26 Rem. Rev. St. (1932) §367; State ex rel.
Dunn v. Plese. 134 Wash. 443, 235 Pac. 961
(1925).
27 People v. Gilbert, 281 Ill. 619, 118 N. E. 292
(1917); State v. Branner, 174 Ind 684, 93 N. E.
70 (1910).
2ARem. Rev. St. (1932) §1050 declares that in
this type of case the fine cannot exceed three
hundred dollars nor the imprisonment six
months. If the criminal code section, Rem. Rev.
St. §2206, applies, there is no objection to the
judgment. That section provides for the reduc-

tion of the amount of the fine by three dollars
for every day spent in jail. Gompers v. Buck
Stove and Range Co.. 221 U. S. 418, 34 L. R. A.
'NS) 874 (1910).
-!' Ibid.

Knox County Council v. State ex rel. Mc-

Cormick, 29 N. E. (2d) 405 (Ind. S. Ct.. Oct.
21, 1940).
' See American Law Institute. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930). commentary to section
203. pp 630-4 fdr the citation of the statutes involved. Some states limit the right to court
appointed counsel to capital or felony cases.
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the broad provisions granting the right to
representation by counsel necessarily imply the right to have counsel appointed
whenever the defendant can not otherwise afford it.
The majority of the constitutions and
early statutes stopped at this point, leaving
it to the courts to determine the right of
the attorneys appointed to receive compensation for their work. There have been a
large number of cases on this problem and
the courts in a majority of the jurisdictions
held that in the absence of statutes specifically allowing compensation the attorney
can look for compensation only to the future ability of the defendant to pay.2 Only
Indiana, Iowa and Wisconsin held the attorney had a correlative right to compensation growing out of his duty
to s'erve when
3
appointed by the court.
The courts that have denied compensation have based their conclusions on several lines of reasoning; which are: (1)
Since attorneys are licensed by the courts
and thereby gain special privileges, they in
turn owe certain duties as officers of the
court, one of which is to represent indigent
defendants, when appointed by the court,
without remuneration. 4 (2) The county is
not liable to the appointed attorney because, the county is not an interested party,
since the prosecution is by and for the state,
or because, by statute, the court cannot
make the county liable except on action of
the county authorities.:, (3) It is the prerogative of the legislature to provide compensation for court officers and, since they

the earlier Indiana decisions which set out
most of the arguments found in the decisions of the three minority states. These
arguments are that the attorney is not
obliged to represent indigents without re-

2 7 C. J. S. 1033 §172; 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 377
t1911). See cases cited in notes 4-7 infra.
IDane County v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861)
,held void a statute providing that county
should not be liable to court appointed counsel); Carpenter v. Dane County. 9 Wis. 249
(1859); Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224
Iowa 516, 278 N. W. 223 (1938) (juvenile court
proceeding); State v. Froah, 220 Iowa 840. 263
N. W. 525 (1935) (held while right to fees they
are limited by the statutory provision): Korf
v. Jasper County. 132 Iowa 682. 108 N. W. 103
(1906); Hyatt v. Hamilton County. 121 Iowa
292. 96 N. W. 855 t1903) (attorney to prosecute
disbarment proceeding); White v. Polk County.
17 Iowa 413 (1864) (special prosecutor); Hall v.
Washington County, 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 473
(1850). For Indiana cases see notes 11-13 infra.
'Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Claims (U. S.)
173 (1864); Vise v. County of Hamilton. 19 Ill.
78 (1857); Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill.
22 (1884); Arkansas County v. Freeman & John-

son. 31 Ark. 266 (1876); Elam v. Johnson. 48
Ga. 348 (1873).
-Pardee v. Salt Lake County. 39 Utah 482,
118 Pac. 122. 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 377 (1911):
Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62 (1860); Board
of Com'rs of Miami County v. Mowbray. 160
Ind. 10. 66 N. E. 46 (1903): Boykin v. People. 23
Colo. 183, 46 Pac. 635 (1896). See 7 C. J. S.
1033 §172.
"Yates v. Taylor County Court. 47 W. Va.
376. 35 S. E. 24 (1900); Arkansas County v.
Friedman & Johnson. 31 Ark. 266 (1876).
7Elam v. Johnson. 48 Ga. 348 (1873): Rowe v.
Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62 (1860): Lamont v. Solano County. 49 Cal. 158 (1874); Henley v. State.
98 Tenn. 665, 41 S. W. 352 (1897); Presby v.
Klickitat County. 5 Wash. 329. 31 Pac. 876 1892)
- 29 N. E. (2d 405 (Ind. S. Ct.. Oct. 21. 1940).
SThe Auditor of Knox County issued the
warrants only after. a judgment against him
mandating the issue of the warrants had been
obtained by the lawyers in the instant case

have made provisions for other court officers, it is presumed that they did not intend
that the appointed attorneys should be
paid.; (4) Because of his professional
standing the attorney is under a moral duty
to aid needy persons requiring 7legal aid
whether they can pay him or not.
The minority view is just as firmly en-

trenched behind reasons for allowing recovery as the majority is behind reasons
for denying it. Most of these have recently
been set out by the Indiana Supreme Court

in Knox County Council v. State ex rel.
McCormick.' In that case two attorneys
were appointed by the Circuit Court to defend a pauper charged with murder. On
change of venue, the cause went to an ad-

joining county where, after the trial, the
court made allowances to the attorneys for
their services in representing the defendant. The Auditor in the envenued county
issued the warrants to the attorneys for
their services 9 but payment was refused by
the Treasurer of that county for want of
funds. The attorneys then brought an action to mandate the county council to appropriate sufficient funds to pay the warrants. From a judgment holding the county
liable for the fees the county council appealed to the state Supreme Court where
the judgment was affirmed.

The court in its decision reviews all of
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muneration for (1) the duty to act as counsel is more than an honorary duty, as some
courts have claimed, for a duty merely
honorary could hardly be susceptible of
enforcement in a court of law,"' and (2)
since the lawyer gets no special benefits

from the public he should not be specially
burdened-the lawyer's "professional services are no more at the mercy of the public,
as to remuneration, than are the goods of
the merchant, the crops of the farmer, or
the wares of the mechanics." Yet the burden of defending the poor rests somewhere
so it must rest on the state or a portion of
it. The court has inherent power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for
the proper administration of justice so,
since it may only try persons given the
right to counsel, must furnish counsel for
those unable to hire their own. and can
only obtain counsel by paying them, it may
10 Webb, Auditor v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854):
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).

11 Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick. 29 N. E. (2d) 405, 408 (Ind. 1940) quoting Webb, Auditor v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854).
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
The basis of the instant case, supra, is very
tersely stated at page 413--"The conclusion
seems unavoidable that it is the duty of courts
to see that criminal cases are t-ied; that these
cases cannot be legally tried unless the defendant, if he is a pauper, is provided with counsel;
that attorneys cannot be compelled to serve
without compensation; and therefore that, in
order to conduct a legal trial, the court must
have power to appoint counsel, and order that

such counsel shall be compensated if necessary;
and that the right to provide compensation can-

not be made to depend upon the will of the
Iegislature or of the county council."
2 Gordon v. Board of Com'rs of Dearborn
County, 52 Ind. 322 (1876); Board of Com'rs of
Fountain County v. Wood. 35 Ind. 70 (1871);
Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 29 N. E. (2d) 405. 408, 413 (Ind. 1940).
Board of Com'rs of Miami County v. Mowbray, 160 Ind. 10, 66 N. E. 46 (1903) and Board

of Com'rs of Vigo County v. Moore, 93 Ind.
App. 180, 166 N. E. 779 (1929) held that the court
could not hold the county liable to pay attorney's fees, however, this view was rejected by
both earlier and later cases.
12 "If the prisoner was brought into court not
decently or comfortably clad, and was too poor
to provide for himself, no one would doubt the
power and duty of the court, on general prin-

ciples, without any statute, to order suitable
clothes for him. It cannot be admitted for a
moment

that the law regards the physical

wants of the citizen of more consequence than
his life or his liberty. .

.

. The generous feel-

hold the county liable to pay such counsel. ' 2
Since the county is a subdivision of the
state it is, as a part of the state, an interested party and so may be held liable for
such expenses. And further, since the
county provides for the physical needs of
the poor it should certainly provide for
their even more vital legal needs;1 3 and if
it pays a prosecuting attorney and all other
expenses of a trial to convict an accused
person, if guilty, it should also provide a
defense attorney, if needed, to help acquit
him, if innocent. 14 '
If the law has remained as first settled
by the courts there would be little value
in discussing the different holdings; it
would be very unlikely that the courts
could have been induced to change positions of such long standing. However, in
most states the legislatures have alleviated
the severity of the early court holdings by
ings which prompt acts of charity are admirable and ennobling to our nature. But even
charity itself almost ceases to be a virtue, when
they, whose duty it is to provide for the poor,
make private charity a pretext for public neglect. If the state has not made provision for
the defense of poor prisoners, it has presumed
and trespassed unjustly upon the rights and
generous feelings of the bar." Knox County
Council v. State ex rel. McCormick. 29 N. E.
(2d) 405, 409 (Ind. 1940) quoting Webb, Auditor
v. Baird. 6 Ind. 13, 18-9 (1854).
14 "Can counsel thus assigned sustain an action against the county for their fees? The first
impression is in the negative. Counsel are officers of the court, and are obliged as such to
render to the court any services that may be
necessary to the maintenance of public justice.
Counsel, with the emoluments, must take the
burdens of their profession. Among the burdens is the gratuitous defense of the poor; and
the remuneration for this, in those cases in
which no remuneration can be had from the
state, must be found, it is urged. in the general income of a profession of which such service is one of the incidents, as well as in the
consciousness of duty performed. For these and
other reasons it has been held that counsel can
not recover from the county compcnsation for
such services. Yet a more careful examination
teaches us that this view is not consistent
either with English precedent or sound public
policy. Counsel for the defense are as essential to the due examination of the case as are
counsel for the prosecution; and to leave the
services of the one unremunerated is as impolitic as it would be to leave the services of
the other unremunerated. If the state pays to
convict its guilty subjects, it should also pay
counsel to acquit such as are innocent." Kerr.
Wharton's Criminal Procedure (10th ed. 1918)
§1494.
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specifically providing for remuneration for
court appointed counsel in certain instances. The statutes are in no way uniform
and in many instances their scope is uncertain. Because of this, the different considerations for and against payment of
counsel enter into the interpretation of
these statutes and in the pleas to the legislatures to alter their statutes or to enact
6
additional legislation.
It is exceedingly difficult to untangle the
opposing considerations involved and suggest an ideal arrangement for paying counsel. Because of his professional position
the lawyer should not refuse to give his
services to those unable to pay for them.'-Yet it is a heavy burden on the lawyer to
require him to defend an indigent to the
fullest extent of his ability without remun-

eration, where the preparation of the defense takes a great deal of time and money.
Too often, when no, or grossly inadequate,
fees are allowed, the defense of the indigent
accused is left to unexperienced recent
graduates who are willing to act as counsel
to get experience in handling cases, or to
"'professional" assigned lawyers who haunt
the jails and who are adept at wringing
every possible cent out of the accused's
family and friends." Even when capable

lawyers are assigned they often slight the
assignment because their time is taken up
by work for regular clients or because they
feel a properly prepared defense would be
too expensive. On the other hand, it is
difficult to justify the situation found in
Illinois 0 and apparently also in New York
where certain lawyers make a practice of

be paid by the county, up to the amount speci13Arizona, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §44-905;
fied. There is, therefore, nothing in the law
California, Gen. Laws of Cal. (1937) Art. 1910,
to prohibit the district court from appointing
H51. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; Colorado, Colo. Stat. Ann.
more than one attorney to defend difficult cases
(1935) §§502, 503, 504; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. of
and those of a grave nature, such as the proseConn. (1930) §6476; Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws
cution of a man for murder, the matter is left
of Fla. (1927) §8375; Hawaii, Rev. Laws of
to the sound judgment of the district judge
Hawaii (193 ) §5354; Idaho, Idaho Code Ann.
presiding, and if the court sees fit to appoint
(1932) §19-1413; Illinois, S. H. Ill. Ann. Stat.
two, attorneys to defend, each is entitled to
(1935) c. 38 §§730, 730a, c. 34 §§163b. 163c; Incompensation for his services." Huntington v.
diana, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann (1933) §§9-1314,
2-211; Iowa, Code of Iowa (1939) §13774; Maine, Yellowstone County, 80 Mont. 20. 25. 257 Pac.
Rev. Stat. of Me. (1930) c. 146 §14; Maryland, 1041, 1043 (1927).
The question of whether an attorney has a
Ann. Code of Md. (1939) art. 26 §§7, 8; Massaright to compensation for prosecuting an appeal
chusetts, Ann. Laws of Mass. (1933) c. 277
or for defending on retrial has called for much
§§55, 56; Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938)
statutory interpretation by the courts; they
§§28.1253, 28.1254, 28.1255; Minnesota, Mason's
have generally interpreted the statutes broadly
Minn. Stat. (1927) §9957; Montana, Rev. Codes
of Mont. (1935) §11886; Nebraska, Comp. Stat. to allow added compensation. Moran v. Otoe
of Neb. (1929) §29-1803. 29-1804; Nevada, Nev. County, 95 Neb. 658. 146 N. W. 956 (1914); Tomlinson v. Monroe County. 134 Iowa 608. 112
Comp. Laws (1929) H510883, 11357, 11358; New
N. W. 100 (1907); Washoe County v. Humboldt
Hampshire, Pub. Laws of N. H. (1926) c. 368
County, 14 Nev. 123 (1879): People v. Ferrero.
§1, 2, 3; New Jersey, N. J. Stat. Ann. (1939)
162 N. Y. 545, 57 N. E. 167 (1900): People v.
§2:190-3; New York, Gilbert's Code of Crim.
Montgomery. 101 App. Div. 338, 91 N. Y. S.
Proc. (1940) 5H308, 308a; North Carolina, N. C.
Code of 1939 Ann. 554515, 4516; North Dakota. 765 (1905): People ex rel. McAvoy v. PenderComp. Laws of N. D. (1913) §8965; Ohio. Pages gast, 67 Misc. 541. 124 N. Y. S. 713 (1910). ConOhio Gen. Code (1939) §§13439-2. 13439-3; Okla- tra, Czaki v. Coler, 44 App. Div. 183, 60 N. Y. S.
homa, Okla. Stat. (1931) §2929. 2930; Pennsyl- 656 (1899); Weisbrod v. Winnebago County, 20
vania, Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. (1930) title 19 Wis. 418 (1866); John v. Municipal Court of
Milwaukee County. 220 Wis. 334. 264 N. W. 829
§784; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws of R. I. (1938)
(1936). See also Reilly v. Berry. 250 N. Y. 456,
c. 626 §§62, 63; South Dakota, S. D. Code (1939)
166 N. E. 165 (1929) for the result of an unduly
§§34.3506, 34.1901; Vermont, Pub. Laws of Vt.
strict statute.
(1933) §2370; Virginia, Va. Code (1936) §4970.
1, Kraus v. State. 102 Nab. 690. 169 N. W. 3
3518; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. (1939) §357.26: Wash(1918) (where attorney volunteered to defend
ington, Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) §2305; Wyoming.
an indigent as a friend of the court he was not
Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) §33-901.
thereafter entitled to compensation for his servAttorneys appointed by the courts to repreices. either in the trial court or on appeal).
sent indigent defendants in Arkansas. Georgia.
is See R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor
Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, West Virginia.
(1919) 114; W. J. Wood. Unexpected Result from
the Federal courts and likely in certain other
the Establishment of the Office of Public Destates are still allowed no recovery from the
fender (1916) 7 J. Crim. Law 595.
state for their services.
16 ". . . it [the Montana statute] merely pro- The Criminal Colrt in Cook County [Chicago]. Illinois. almost always allows the maxivides that whenever an attorney defends an inmum statutory fee [$250] in all cases where an
digent person accused of crime his fee shall
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representing indigents charged with capital offenses merely for the fees allowed.
While certain types of cases, especially
capital cases, should and usually do take
much more of the attorney's time and effort than others, it is certainly debatable

question of the representation of the indigent defendant satisfactorily in the metropolitan districts; but it is very unlikely
that such offices would be practical in the
less populous
districts throughout the
2
country. '

whether substantial fees should be allowed
in these cases and none at all in the others,
as some statutes have provided.2- '
The problem is a difficult one; indeed,
it is very unlikely that any arrangement
could work well in all jurisdictions-a
method of compensation in a district where
lawyers generally have some spare time,
where the court procedure is fairly simple,
and where the expenses of practicing law
are comparatively low would likely be
wholly inadequate in a large metropolitan
district. Full time public defenders, appointed for a specified term and receiving
a fixed salary, have apparently solved the

Yet it would seem very proper to offer
some suggestions. The many state statutds
allowing payment are an indication that
there is a general feeling that counsel
should be paid; and the courts of Indiana,
Iowa, and Wisconsin have furnished sufficient reasons for doing so. Because the
adequate defense of those accused of any
crime take time and money, payment
should seemingly be made in all cases and
should bear some relation to the amount of
work done.2 2 The attorney should be allowed a reasonable fee for his work and
reimbursement for reasonably necessary
expenses incurred upon appea 2 3 or retrial

attorney is assigned. Certain lawyers are thus
able to make a practice of inducing those
charged with capital offenses to object to be-

nal Justice

ing represented by the public defender and so

get themselves appointed to represent these
prisoners. Judging only from the New York
court opinions it appears that the courts in that
state also generally allow the maximum fee

[$1,000].
-2 Florida. Illinois, New Jersey. Massachu-

setts. New York. North Carolina, Pennsylvania.
and Virginia allow compensation only in capital offenses; Minnesota, Ohio and Vermont also
allow compensation only in certain cases. No
relief is given the attorney who represents indigents in other cases in these states.
21 The defense of indigents is handled by
public defenders in California. Connecticut. and
certain more populous districts in Illinois. Minnesota, Nebraska. and Virginia.
The problem of compensation for court appointed counsel, discussed in this note is only
one phase of the much larger problem of obtaining adequate defense of the poor. The question of the advisability of public defenders is

inexorably bound up with this larger problem.

For a full discussion see the following articles
that have previously appeared in the Journal:
N. F. Baker. The Public Defender's Work in
Cook County (1934) 25 J. Crim. Law 5; P. J.
Finnegan The Work of the Public Defender of
Cook County (1936), 26 J. Crim. Law 709. C
Mishkin, The Public Defender (1931). 2
Crim
Law 489, reprinted from 14 Chicago Ba, Assn
Rec. 98; F. R. Anman. Public Defender in the
Municipal Courts of Columbus (1930). 21 J.
Crim. Law 392; R. G. DeForest. Public Defender
in Connecticut (1928). 18 J. Crim. Law 522: S.
Rubin. The Public Defender. An Aid to Crimi-

(1927)

18 J. Crim Law 345; K.

Wynne, Public Defenders in Connecticut (1926),

17 J. Crim. Law 358; Note (1923). 14 J. Crim.

Law 319, reprinted from The Baltimore Sun,
Jan. 29, 1922; W. J. Wood, Necessity for Public
Defender Established by Statistics (1916), 7 J.
Crim. Law 230; M. C. Goldman, The Necessity
for a Public Defender (1915), 5 J. Crim. Law
660; M. C. Goldman, Public Defender (1915), 6
J. Crim. Law 557; R. Ferrari, H. A. Forster,
A. E. Adelman and J. H. Stolper. On the Public Defender, a Symposium (1915), 6 J. Crim.
Law 371; A. Adelman, In Defense of the Public Defender (1914),* 5 J. Crim. Law 494. See
14 J. Crim. Law 556 for a complete bibliography
on the public defender to 1924. See also R. H.
Smith. Growth of Legal Aid Work in the United
States (1926, rev. ed. 1936); R. H. Smith. Justice
and the Poor (1919); M. C. Goldman, The Public Defender, a Necessary Factor in the Administration of Justice (1917).
22 New York requires the action to be disposed of by a formal order, ". . . by a verdict
of not guilty, by a conviction or a plea of guilty
and a judgment entered thereon, or else by an
order of the court dismissing the indictmpnt".
so the courts have refused to allow a fee where
there was a mistrial, Stern v. Taylor. 2 N. Y. S.
(2d) 42 (1938): or an agreement not to prosecute. Snitkin v. Taylor, 276 N. Y. 148. 11 N. E.
(2d) 573 (1938). regardless of the amount of
work done by the attorney.
2%Additional compensation is allowed by statute to one who prosecutes an appeal in Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan. Nevada. New York. South Dakota, Wisconsin and Hawaii. Other states, by
statutory construction, allow added compensation on appeal See note 16 supra. Many states

also allow reasonable expenses incurred in the
defense of

'we indigent.
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as well as on the original trial.-" Since the
courts often make a practice of allowing the
maximum fee in practically all cases, this
maximum, if a substantial amount, should
not be set at a flat figure but should be a
stipulated amount for each trial, or better,

for each day of actual trial work. : And
since, at best, a statute can provide payment that only approximates reasonable
compensation, setting different maximums
for different classes of cases seems justifiable.

DONALD G. BAIRD.

EVIDENCE OF WOUNDS AS SHOWING INTENT TO MURDER [ALABAMA]
In State v. Beck' the defendant's son,
allegedly at the defendant's bidding, shot
and wounded one Daughtry. For this the
defendant and the son were indicted; it
being alleged that they "unlawfully and
with malice aforethought did assault Ralph
Daughtry with intent to murder him." A
severance was granted and the defendant
was tried and convicted of assault with intent to murder. The question on appeal is
whether testimony allowed by the trial
court that the complainant had "continuously had boils around the wound made
by the shot of Wiley Beck's pistol" was
properly admitted. The court of appeals
held such evidence irrevelant and prejudicial to the defendant, and reversed the
trial court. The Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court on the grounds that in
a situation where murderous intent is involved evidence of the nature and result
of the wound may properly be considered
in ascertaining the intent of the assault.
In support of their holding the supreme
court offered the following statement in
Underhill's treatise on Criminal Evidence:
"The evidence of the condition of the person injured, showing the character of his
wounds and the manner in which they were
24 "Nearly every case, if it is to be properly
prepared and tried, involves some cash outlay.
but in the great majority of cases. even where
counsel is assigned, no provision is made for
such expense. This is a substantial defect in
the assigned counsel plan. It means that either
the attorney must pay the incidental expenses
out of his own pocket, which, of course, he
cannot afford to do, and therefore does not do.
or the defendant must go to trial and do the
best he can in spite of an inadequate preparation of his case. In only eight States are the
expenses defrayed by the State. and in two of
these the expenses will be borne by the State
only in capital cases. In seven States the law
expressly prohibits any reimbursement to the
lawyer for such incidental expenses." R. H.
Smith. Growth of Legal-Aid Work in the
United States (rev. ed. 1936) 78.
2. There are great differences in the size of
the fees allowed by the different state statutes.

treated by the physician, and evidence to
show how long he was confined in a hos-

pital is always relevant on the prosecution
for assault with intent to murder to show
the grevious nature of the injury inflicted,
from which injury the court may infer that
the accused intended to kill the person assaulted."
The court then cites Wright v. State- as
authority for its holding. In that case the
question raised was the admissibility of

evidence of the number of wounds inflicted
upon the complainant and its bearing upon
the defendant's intent; testimony was introduced to show that there were fourteen
or fifteen wounds of a serious nature upon
the complainant's body. In that situation
it is clear the number of wounds should be
taken into consideration by the jury. Such
wounds furnish a fairly sound yardstick in
determining the defendant's state of mind
-that he meant to do more than merely
assault. They lend probative force to the
state's hypothesis that the defendant in-

tended to murder the complainant.
This principle, as stated in Underhill and
as applied in the Wright case, has been generally accepted in determining intent in
criminal cases.I However, it seems clear
Maximums range from $1.000 in New York,
$250 in Illinois, and $200 in Pennsylvania and
Hawaii to $25 in North Dakota, Oklahoma and
Virginia; the statutes in Indiana, Maine. Massachusetts. Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina and Vermont provide for "reasonable" fees
and set no maximum; the statutes in Idaho.
Iowa and Wyoming allow certain fixed fees to
the court appointed counsel.
1 197 So. 43 (Ala. S. Ct.. Apr. 4. 1940). reversing 197 So. 42 (Ala. App. Ct.. Feb. 27. 1940).
2 Underhill. Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 1935)
§596.
n 184 Ala. 596, 42 So. 745 (1907).
4 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed. 1935)
§197; Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 255. 105
S. W. (2d) 820 (1928); State v. Harmon, 127 S.
Car. 424, 121 S. E. 257 (1924); State v. Compton.
48 S. Dak. 430. 205- N. W. 31 (1925); State v.
Young. 52 Ore. 227. 96 Pac. 1067 (1908): Stevens
v. State. 84 Neb. 759. 122 N. W. 58 (1909).
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that in the instant case evidence of the boils
presents an entirely different situation.
Boils around a wound, unlike fourteen
knife thrusts, are demonstrative of no malicious intent on the part of the defendant.
The principle of admitting evidence to
show intent is subject to the basic rule underlying the entire law of evidence-that it
must be relevant to the issue to which it
is addressed. The evidence as to the boils
lacks this essential element; it neither
proves nor supports any theory of the state
as to the defendant's intent at the time of
the shooting. 5
The gunshot wound itself furnishes such
evidence and in Alabama establishes a
strong presumption of intent to murder.6
The presence of this presumption may
furnish a reasonable explanation of the
court's decision in the instant case. It may
have considered that the evidence of the
wound established such a strong case that
it could not be overcome by the effect of
•Harcrow v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 274. 261
S. W. 1046 (1924) is the only case similar to the
instant case found; the criticisms of the instant
case are also applicable to it.
"There are two complaints evidenced by bills
of exception showing objections to testimony as
to the fact that Blount took pneumonia, and
pus formed in the wound, and a rib had to be
taken out, and that he wore a tube for some
time; also that the doctor thought Blount was
going to aie, and told him so. We do not regard either of the bills as presenting serious
error.

.

.

. In view of the fact that the jury

gave the appellant the lowest penalty, we do
not regard the evidence as calculated to affect
the minds of the jury or inflame them ...
The deadly character of the weapon and the
serious nature of the injury inflicted were both

the other improperly admitted testimony.
In other words, the error was of insufficient
importance to command a new trial with
its attendant expenses, delays and inconveniences.
Such a rationalization, however, is not
justified for, while the presence of intent
might have already been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by the other evidence,
nevertheless other elements of the crime
were quite likely in issue. Evidence of the
boils was certainly highly inflammatory
and its admission could easily prejudice the
jury and result in a very unfair trial of
the defendant. Evidence, when relevant,
7
may be prejudicial and still be admissible.
But when it is both irrelevant and prejudicial, as in the case here, it is difficult to
see how a trial judge, in the reasonable
exercise of his judicial discretion could
permit its use, and even more unexplainable, how an appellate court could sanction
such discretion.
LERoY A. SOLBERG.
for the jury and were material as reflecting the
intent and purpose of the appellant and the
character of the weapon used by him." id. 1048.
GUnderhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 1935)
§596 n. 43; Henson v. State, 112 Ala. 41, 21 So.
79 (1895); DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 (1882);
Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 332 (1875); Clements v.
State, 50 Ala. 117 (1873).
"The general rule, however, is that the law
presumes that a man intends the natural and
necessary consequences of his acts; and so in
case of an assault with a dangerous or deadly
weapon used in such a way as naturally, probably, or reasonably to produce death or prejudice life. intent to kill is presumed." 30 C. J.
140 §347.
7For a discussion of prejudicial testimony
see Note (1941), 31 J. Crim. Law 604.

